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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE} STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE C^SE 
This is a suit for an accounting between two equal partners 
who were owners of a motel in Provo, Utah. The parties stipu-
lated, and the Court so ordered that the motel be sold and, after 
payment of debts and obligations, the profits be divided equally 
between the parties subject to an offsetting judgment to one or 
the other party for the net difference tin their draw accounts as 
established by the Court based on the evidence at trial. 
It should be stated that Appellant's accusation that "the 
District Court was very ill during this period", and "the 
accounting data was very complex" seems to imply a measure of 
incompetence of the Court in hearing thijs case. 
Judge Cullen Christensen did become ill for a short period 
after the trial. He resumed deliberations in this case after his 
illness, however, and spent an extraordinary amount of effort and 
time in a thorough evaluation of the evidence and law before 
rendering judgment. This implication qf judicial neglect is not 
supported in Appellant's brief or t(ie record herein and is 
totally unfounded. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Respondent states the following additional issue in 
this appeal: 
A PARTNER WHO DIVERTS ASSETS FROM PARTNERSHIP 
ACCOUNTS INTO HIS PERSONAL ACCOUNTS AND 
COMMINGLES PARTNERSHIP AND PERSONAL ASSETS 
HAS THE BURDEN OF ( 1 ) PROVING WHICH ACCOUNTS 
WERE PARTNERSHIP AND WHICH WERE NOT, ( 2 ) 
IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE OF FUNDS CONTAINED IN 
NON-PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTS, AND ( 3 ) PROVING 
THAT FUNDS WHICH HAD BEEN IN PARTNERSHIP 
ACCOUNTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY RECOVERED WERE 
ADEQUATELY ACCOUNTED FOR. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
T r i a l was h e l d b e f o r e t h e H o n o r a b l e C u l l e n Y. C h r i s t e n s e n , 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e , on S e p t e m b e r 2 9 , 3 0 , 1 9 8 6 , a n d O c t o b e r 1 7 , 
1 9 8 6 . On December 8 , 1 9 8 6 , j u d g m e n t was g r a n t e d a g a i n s t J e n s e n 
a n d f o r F o l s o m . P o s t t r i a l m o t i o n s w e r e h e a r d b y t h e C o u r t and 
t h e J u d g m e n t , F i n d i n g s o f F a c t a n d C o n c l u s i o n s o f Law w e r e i s s u e d 
on A u g u s t 1 4 , 1 9 8 7 . 
J e n s e n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e C o u r t *s j u d g m e n t and t h e 
p o s t j u d g m e n t m o t i o n s r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o a r e i n c o m p l e t e a n d 
m i s s t a t e d . H o w e v e r , i n a s m u c h a s t h o s e m i s s t a t e m e n t s a r e n o t a 
p a r t o f J e n s e n ' s a r g u m e n t s , t h e y w i l l b e d e a l t w i t h b y F o l s o m 
o n l y a s t h e y r e l a t e t o t h e a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d by J e n s e n . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 . I n M a y , 1 9 8 0 , P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t R o d n e y J e n s e n 
( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s " J e n s e n " ) and D e f e n d a n t - R e s p o n d e n t 
Leo F . F o l s o m ( h e r e i n a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o a s " F o l s o m " ) p u r c h a s e d t h e 
2 
Quality Inn Motel (hereinafter referred to as "the motel") in 
Provo, Utah. (Finding 1, undisputed).1 
2. They initially intended to do business as a corporation 
by the name of Performance Investment Corporation. The corpora-
tion, however, was never fully organized, and both parties 
treated the business as a partnership. The parties stipulated 
during trial that the business be considered a partnership in 
which the "capital accounts" and the Mdraws" of both parties 
should be equal. (Findings 1 and 2; undjisputed) . 
3. The parties took over control iof the motel on about May 
16, 1980. Folsom assumed the day-to-day management of the 
business and established three (3) bank accounts in Provo, Utah, 
for the motel with both parties as signatories. (Finding 5; 
undisputed). 
4. Folsom managed the business unltil about April 12, 1982. 
Jensen then accused him of misappropriating funds and instituted 
this lawsuit. Jensen took over possession and management of the 
business and Folsom turned over to him a,ll of the bank records of 
the business. (Finding 13; undisputed), 
5. On or about December 27, 1982, the parties entered into 
a stipulation which was reduced to an Ojrder of the Court provid-
ing : 
1
 All references entitled "Finding' refer to the Findings of 
Fact rendered by the District Court in this action. 
3 
(a) Jensen not withdraw any of the funds of the 
company for his own purposes. 
(b) Jensen pay no company expenses, except for 
supplies and repairs, in excess of $500, without 
approval of Folsom, and 
(c) Jensen provide a full financial accounting 
since he took over the business and from thence forth a 
monthly accounting of all income and expenses, includ-
ing copies of the daily reports and deposit receipts. 
(Finding 24; Record, pp. 78-79, undisputed). 
6. After taking control of the business, Jensen closed out 
the three (3) existing motel bank accounts and subsequently 
established at least fifteen (15) separate bank accounts that the 
interim receiver was able to identify, into which funds of the 
motel could be traced; these accounts were located in various 
banks in Utah and California in the names of Performance 
Corporation, Performance Investment Corporation of Utah, Quality 
Management Associates, Quality Inn, Apple City Apartments, and in 
the personal names of Rodney and Iris Jensen; that Folsom had no 
signature authority on these accounts. (Finding 22; Record, pp. 
1286-1306; 1401-1404; Exhibit 18-27). 
7. Thereafter, the pleading record is replete with efforts 
on the part of Folsom to obtain discovery from Jensen concerning 
the motel accounting. Folsom filed eight (8) Orders to Show 
Cause and Motions to Compel Discovery, all relating to monthly 
4 
income and accounting of the business. (Finding 50; undisputed). 
The record and the Court's Findings 29, 30/ 31/ 32, 50# 51/ 52/ 
53/ 54/ and 55 reveal that Jensen continually refused to provide 
such bank and accounting records to Fol|som and the receivers/ 
even up to the trial itself. The Court/ during trial, ordered 
Jensen to provide records which were not produced. (Findings 54 
and 55). These records related primarily to personal bank 
accounts in the State of California. Jensen admitted commingling 
motel money with his personal funds in at least three (3) 
personal accounts in California (Finding 28; Record, pp. 1471-
1476). 
8. Jensen had control and management of the motel from 
April 12/ 1982/ until the appointment of a permanent receiver in 
July 3/ 1985. During that period/ Jensen made no payments to 
Folsom and Folsom had no access to the business or its assets. 
(Finding 21/ undisputed). 
9. Jensen established a practice of making a large number 
of interaccount transfers of funds amorig the various accounts 
established, using check deposits, wire transfers, and payments 
by cashiers check, including into anfl out of his personal 
accounts in Utah and California. Jensein admitted this at trial 
and claimed that it was for the purpose of "hiding it from the 
IRS". (Record, pp. 1471-1476). Thi£ practice also had the 
effect of hiding money from Folsom and making it difficult for 
the interim receiver to account for the (funds. (Finding 23). 
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10. In a hearing on December 7, 1984, the Court gave Jensen 
until January 1, 1985, to provide all requested records or a 
permanent receiver would be ordered. Jensen again failed to 
fully comply; and as a result, the Court appointed a permanent 
receiver who took control of the business from Jensen on July 3, 
1985 (Record, p. 1401). 
11. Both the interim receiver and the permanent receiver 
have taken what accounting information that was available to them 
and compiled financial statements for the motel. The permanent 
receiver carried over the account balances determined by the 
interim receiver. Neither were able to do an audit, and neither 
were able to certify that all of the funds of the motel had been 
accounted for. (Finding 32; Record, pp. 1098-1101; 1111-1113). 
12. The interim receiver established a draw account for 
Folsom (Exhibit 1) and for Jensen (Exhibit 2). The balance of 
Folsom's draw account was established at $99,001.30, and the 
balance of Jensen's was established at $125,571.87. (Findings 33 
and 34; Exhibits 1 and 2). 
13. Neither of these draw balances were considered by 
either party as an accurate accounting of their actual drawings, 
but both parties stipulated, at trial, to use the figures as a 
starting point, proposing various adjustments upward and downward 
to arrive at the claimed "draw" of each party. (Finding 35, 
undisputed). 
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14. The parties further stipulated at trial that the motel 
be sold; and after payment of debts and obligations, all profits 
be divided equally, subject to a judgment over against one or the 
other for the net difference in their draw accounts as estab-
lished by the court. (Finding 3; undisputed). 
15. The evidence established that during the approximate 
time that Folsom managed the business, he paid out to himself as 
draws the sum of $29,500. When he disbursed monies to himself, 
he also made equivalent payments to Jensen that totalled $31,500. 
(Finding 14). The Court in so holding, reviewed the records of 
the interim receiver, (Exhibits 1, 2, and 3 plus all the checks 
i 
written by Folsom in Exhibit 4); the testimony of the interim 
receiver (Record, pp. 1101-1127); the testimony of Bruce Wisan, 
the receiver, (Record, pp. 1092-1101); and the testimony of 
Folsom (Record, pp. 1140-1178). 
16. Jensen made no allegation and no evidence was received 
that Folsom ever commingled any funds of the motel with his own 
personal funds. (Finding 14). Folsom's testimony reflected that 
he did not (Record, pp. 1140-1178). 
17. Scott Evans, a CPA retained by Folsom, prepared 
summaries from the bank accounts established by Jensen in Utah 
and California to determine the sums diverted by Jensen, and 
testified as to those totals specified in Exhibits 18-21 (Record, 
pp. 1285-1343), and the supporting Exhibits 20 and 21. This 
evidence established funds improperly diverted by Jensen in the 
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sum of $349,822.63. (Exhibit 18). Jensen did not object to the 
admission of this accounting and bank information into evidence. 
(Record, pp. 1291-1294). He put on no evidence whatsoever to 
refute the testimony of Evans, or Exhibits 18-26. In fact, he 
admitted making such transfers, but again claimed it was for the 
purpose of hiding it from the IRS. (Record, pp. 1471-1476). 
Jensen continually refused to provide all of the bank records in 
California relating to these transactions for a proper accounting 
by the receiver or Folsom. (Record, pp. 1470-1476). 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Folsom seeks affirmation of the Fourth Judicial District 
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
rendered herein and dismissal of Jensen's appeal. Folsom further 
seeks payment of his attorney's fees, court costs, and expenses 
in defending this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The District Court had sufficient evidence to support 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law following the trial 
and post trial hearings herein. 
2. A partner who diverts assets from partnership accounts 
into his personal accounts and commingles partnership and 
personal assets has the burden of (1) proving which accounts were 
partnership and which were not, (2) identifying the source of 
funds contained in non-partnership accounts, and (3) proving that 
8 
funds which had been in partnership accounts and subsequently 
recovered were adequately accounted for 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I AND Up 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 8 AND 12. 
This point addresses the First and Second Points of Jensen's 
brief. 
The issue before the trial court that these Findings deal 
with revolve around the down payment paid by Jensen and Folsom to 
acquire the motel. There was no dispute that each of the parties 
was to supply one-half of the down payment, but Jensen did not 
have sufficient funds to pay all of his half. A great portion of 
this down payment of $125,000 was paid in "bags of silver", for 
which there is little written documentation. The Court was left 
to rely on the testimony of Jensen and Folsom, which was con-
flicting and inconsistent. Folsom testified, that of the total 
down payment, he paid a total of about $95,000; and Jensen paid 
about $30,000. (Record, p. 1180). Jensen claimed he had 
supplied two (2) bags of silver, but on cross-examination was 
impeached with his prior deposition wherein he had testified that 
he could not remember how much silver he had supplied. (Record, 
pp. 1212-1213). Jensen testified that of the five (5) bags of 
silver given for the down payment, he paid two (2) and Folsom 
supplied two (2) initially. (Record, p. 1212). He agreed that 
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Folsom put up a third bag, but that he put in an additional 
$15,000 so they equated (Record, pp. 1212-1213). When asked 
about the $30,000 in diamonds Folsom provided, Jensen admitted 
the contribution, but claimed he made up all the difference in 
checks he paid in to equalize the down payments. (Record, p. 
1232). Jensen claimed he had all the checks to prove his share 
was paid and that some of those checks "are down in my car". 
(Record, p. 1203). In fact, however, no such evidence was 
forthcoming. At trial, Folsom contended that some of the 
payments that the interim receiver had accounted for as a "draw" 
or "loan" to Folsom were in fact a repayment of a loan that 
Folsom made to Jensen for part of Jensen's share of the down 
payment. Therefore, Folsom asserted the payments out of the 
business to Folsom to repay these amounts were not a draw to 
Folsom, but were in fact a draw by Jensen to repay Folsom. 
The trial court found that indeed Folsom did loan Jensen 
part of his share of the down payment and that $34,475 of the 
motel's funds that were paid to Folsom were a draw by Jensen to 
repay this loan. Therefore, the Court adjusted Folsom1s "draw-
ings" accounted for by the interim receiver downward by $34,475 
and adjusted Jensen's upward by the same amount. 
Findings 6-12; 37(2) and 49(3) relate to this issue. These 
Findings were made based on the testimony of the parties, 
Exhibits 13, 14, 16, 17, and 46 and after giving due weight to 
the credibility of the witnesses. 
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In his brief, pages 10-11, Jensen quotes testimony from the 
trial transcript wherein he testified that he did not authorize 
Folsom to repay himself with loans from the company. This 
testimony has no relevance whatever to the Court's holding in 
Finding 12. The specified checks wrlitten by Folsom and his 
family, during the period of time he was managing the motel, had 
nothing to do with the $34,475 figute relating to the down 
payment which the Court determined in Findings 11(c) and 12. 
Since the greater weight of evidence supports the Court's 
Findings, they should be upheld. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT [SUPPORT TO THE 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 17. 
Exhibit 1 reflects a draw to Leo Folsom on 4/15/82, Check 
1702, in the sum of $30,000. Folsom testified as to the nature 
and purpose of this draw: 
Q: All right. Towards the bottom, on the 
fifth line from the bottom, there's an entry 
"Leo Folsom, 4/15/82, checK No. 1702, for 
$30,000. Would you explain tjiat item? 
A: Yes, that in the spring of 1982 we took 
a loan against the motel foij $60,000, with 
the agreement that we would! make loan from 
that account to ourselves, 50 percent to Rod 
and 50 percent to myself. And this is 50 
percent of that $60,000 loan. 
Q: Under that is another it^m — 
THE COURT: Well, let me have an 
explanation of that. Does he contend this is 
a proper draw or improperly? 
11 
Q: (By Mr. Ungricht) Is that a loan that 
you or Rod was intending to pay back to the 
company? 
A: No. 
Q: Or was that monies that you distributed 
to yourselves? 
A: No, it was not intended that we pay it 
back. If I called it a loan, that was a 
misrepresentation. It was taken as a loan 
from the bank, but our intent was that we 
would divide it equally on a cash basis to 
ourselves. In effect, I suppose, a draw, if 
that's the right term. 
Q: But it's in effect not intending that 
either of you do anything but take that money 
out for your own benefit? 
A: That's correct. 
(Record, pp. 1256-1257). 
Jensen does not deny the existence of the loan, or that each 
was given $30,000 from the proceeds thereof. His only claim is 
that the receiver did charge this sum to Jensen's draw account, 
but it was in small amounts of between $1,000 to $7,000. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 12). 
However, Jensen put on no evidence whatsoever to support 
this claim. There was no evidence from Jensen, the interim 
receiver, the receiver, or from CPA Evans to support this claim 
or to identify specifically amounts charged as draws for this 
purpose. Jensen had the burden to prove that he charged this sum 
in his draw account and identify the "small amounts" specifi-
cally. No such evidence was presented at trial. He did attempt 
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to present such evidence on a post trial motion, but his attempt 
to introduce new evidence after judgment had been rendered was 
properly denied. (Record, pp. 918-919). 
Introducing such new evidence, not had at trial, in his 
brief on appeal, is likewise improper. 
Finding 17 is therefore a proper finding based upon suffi-
cient evidence and should be upheld. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 20. 
Once again, the Court was left to evaluate the testimony of 
Jensen and Folsom, plus the conduct of the interim receiver, as a 
basis for its decision in Finding 20. 
In evaluating this item, and after discussing the matter 
with Folsom, the interim receiver divided this sum up equally 
between Folsom and Jensen, and so recorded it in Exhibits 1 and 
2. The Court's Finding is consistent with Exhibits 1 and 2. It 
is also consistent with the evidence and the Court's Finding 14 
herein (not contested by Jensen) that each time Folsom disbursed 
amounts to himself that he considered drawings, he made equiva-
lent payments to Jensen. 
Folsom testified as follows: 
Q: Have you heard Mr. Heaton testify that 
there was approximately $23,000 in cash? 
A: Yes. 
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Q: That was noted for a shortage between 
what the record showed and what was 
deposited. Can you explain how that sum 
accrued? 
A: Yes. We purposely withheld cash during 
the latter part of 1981, I believe, which 
cash we divided between the two of us. 
Q: Is it your testimony that $23,000 was 
divided equally between you and Mr. Jensen? 
A: I believe it was. 
(Record, p. 1140) 
Jensen denied that he got half of it, but admitted that he 
received some. (Record, p. 1225). 
All of the evidence tended to show that Folsom did not 
commingle funds, did not divert funds, and properly accounted for 
funds. Just the opposite was true of Jensen. The Court, in 
weighing the evidence, also weighed the be 1 ie vabi 1 ity and 
credibility of both parties. Obviously, the testimony of Folsom 
had more credibility than Jensen, and was consistent with 
Folsom1s entire course of dealing with Jensen. 
The Court's decision in Finding 20 is based on the greater 
weight of the evidence and should be upheld. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 38. 
During the trial, Scott Evans, a CPA, testified as an expert 
witness for Folsom. Exhibit 18 is an accounting summary prepared 
by Evans showing monies diverted by Jensen from the motel to 
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various of his personal accounts. Mr- Evans found that Jensen 
made out two (2) checks in the amount of $60,000 on August 15, 
1983, and September 30, 1983, respectively. One was used to 
purchase a cashiers check, and one was payable to Jensen person-
ally. Jensen admits that these checks were disbursed, but claims 
that for some unexplained reason he redeposited one of the 
checks. (Record, pp. 1376-1378). The interim receiver, relying 
on this claim, only charged one of the $60,000 checks to Jensen. 
Evans found that there was no evidenc0 that Jensen did in fact 
redeposit one of the checks. 
Evans testified as follows: 
A: I included the first item for $60,000 
because, which is a cashiers check issued on 
9/30 of '83. And that will be in the backup 
pages to exhibit 18, as to the specific check 
number and so on. It was a cashiers check, 
issued on 9/30 of '83, which cleared the bank 
on 9/30. The check cleared the bank on 9/30 
of '83. It was made out to First Security 
Bank. and there was no underlying document-
ation or evidence to show what it went for, 
who it went to, or where the ultimate 
disposition of funds were. 
Q: All right. And do you have any under-
standing of why Mr. Heaton diLd not include 
that on his exhibit? 
A: I asked him last night. And we reviewed 
those, the checks. He was under the under-
standing that at some point in time those 
funds were returned to the corporation. I 
could find no correlation between that check 
being issued and being returned to the 
corporation. 
(Record, p. 1320) 
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* * * 
Q: All right. Would you please explain why 
you did not certify that those should be 
amounts to be credited to Mr. Jensen's favor? 
A: Now, maybe I could explain herein. My 
role was different than Mr. Heaton's. Mr. 
Heaton was performing a compilation. And the 
evidence that needed to be supplied to him 
was much different than if he were performing 
an audit, or if I were performing an audit, 
and expressing a professional opinion on 
this. And, so he could include those without 
ample support or evidence, from a profes-
sional standpoint or from a verification 
standpoint or from a testifying standpoint. 
I was unable to trace these amounts from 
or into the bank accounts of the company. 
Q: What you are getting at in your comment 
is, you are not trying to criticize Mr. 
Heaton or what he did in this statement? 
A: No. He did a very good job, within the 
scope of what he was doing. But his scope 
was not designed to verify amounts, necessar-
ily, or to have them proved to him that they 
were correct or accurate. And I was unable 
to trace these amounts into the corporate 
account." 
(Record, pp. 1325-1326). 
Jensen claims that the redeposit is shown on the next 
month's bank statement, but all that statement shows is a $60,000 
deposit and yet a third $60,000 check being made the same day 
similar to the numerous transfers of funds and kiting of the 
accounts that Jensen was deliberately involved in. He provided 
no other deposit slips, cancelled checks or evidence of any kind 
to support his claim. The audit that Folsom's expert conducted 
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could not establish any connection between those items claimed by 
Jensen. 
It is clear from the record that, as relates to the second 
September 30, 1983 check, there is no credible evidence that the 
money was ever returned to the motel accpunts. Finding 38 by the 
Court is correct and therefore should be upheld. 
POINT VI. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 40 . 
As t o F i n d i n g 40 , t h e r e was no c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t 
J e n s e n ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e $ 1 7 , 3 3 5 . 5 8 c h e c k was payment fo r t h e 
mote l a c c o u n t as opposed t o a p e r s o n a l d ^ b t . 
E x h i b i t 26 shows a check w r i t t e n on a m o t e l a c c o u n t t o t h e 
I n t e r n a l Revenue in t h e sum of $ 1 7 , 3 3 5 . 5 0 d a t e d 1 / 2 6 / 8 4 , endo r sed 
by J e n s e n . The c h e c k d o e s n o t r e f l e c t on w h o ' s b e h a l f t h e 
p a y m e n t was made . The a c c o u n t a n t , Mf. E v a n s , t e s t i f i e d a s 
f o l l o w s : 
Q: All right. What was th£ second situ-
ation? 
A: The second, and the third, perhaps we 
could take together. They were show to me as 
a zerox [sic] copy of the fact of two checks. 
One was made out to the Internal Revenue 
Service. The other was inade out to 
Performance Corporation. Neither one of 
which could I trace into the company bank 
account. The one made out to the Internal 
Revenue Service, I have no way of knowing if 
that was for an estimated individual tax 
payment or what ever source. There was just 
no supporting evidence that it was na [sic] 
obligation of the company. 
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Q: Or that it was credited to the company? 
A: Yes. 
(Record, pp. 1325-1326) 
Jensen's entire testimony with regard to his relationship 
with the IRS does not lend him much credibility. As mentioned 
above, he uses as an excuse for diverting large sums of money 
into his private accounts, the fact that he was trying to hide it 
from the IRS. (Record, pp. 1206-1207; 1414-1415). He testified 
further that when the first levy occurred, he transferred funds 
around between the various accounts to hide it. He would then 
send the IRS a payment when they called him about it. (Record, 
p. 1415). When asked if he ever sat down for an accounting with 
the IRS or got documents confirming what was owed or paid, he 
said no, because he didn't have the figures. He then admitted 
that he settled up with them "in the neighborhood of probably 
about $50,000. (Record, p. 1416). Jensen provided no documents 
whatever, other than those few admitted, to corroborate this 
testimony. When asked for such documentation, he referred to 
Exhibit 34 confirming receipt of his payment for $10,000. 
(Record, p. 1417). He further admitted that he filed no tax 
returns on behalf of the motel. (Record, p. 1417). 
Exhibit 38 is a check drawn on his personal account in 
California in the sum of $6,000. Jensen testified that he 
purchased a cashiers check and used it to pay company taxes. 
18 
Exhibit 44 was offered by Jensen ak a confirmation from the 
IRS of the payments made by the motel for taxes for the period 
11/28/83 to 8/13/84. The $6,000 payment is located thereon, and 
the Court therefore credited Jensen's draw account for this 
$6,000 payment. However, the alleged $17,335 payment is not 
found on Exhibit 44, even though it was alleged to have been made 
on January 26, 1984 (Record, pp. 144^-1446), which is in the 
period of time included in Exhibit 44. Jensen provided no other 
evidence to support his claim that the payment was for the 
benefit of the company. 
There was not sufficient evidence, however, to credit him 
with the $17,373.58 check and the Court $o ruled. 
Finding 40 is proper based upon the evidence submitted and 
should therefore be upheld. 
POINT VII. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 4 1 . 
J e n s e n a r g u e s t h a t h i s d raw a c c o u n t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n 
c r e d i t e d w i t h $ 7 7 , 5 0 0 n o t t h e $70 ,500 sum c r e d i t e d . He b a s e s 
t h i s argument on a w i t h d r a w a l from one of h i s p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t s 
i n C a l i f o r n i a on J u l y 1 , 1985, i n t h e sum of $77,500 and E x h i b i t 
32 which shows a J u l y 3 , 1985 d e p o s i t of $77 ,495 t o t h e p e r s o n a l 
a c c o u n t of Rod J e n s e n and I r i s J e n s e n . These documents a l o n e 
show o n l y J e n s e n t r a n s f e r r i n g t h i s sum df money from one of h i s 
p e r s o n a l a c c o u n t s t o a n o t h e r . 
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Mr. Wisan, the receiver, testified as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. Harrison) Now, Mr. Wisan, I 
have one other question for you: Was there a 
time after your appointment in July that you 
received a sum of $77,500 from Mr. Jensen? 
A: It was an amount less than that, $6,000 
less than that. In the initial transfer the 
bank understood that there was that sum on 
money available to be transferred. However, 
just before my appointment as Receiver, Mr. 
Jensen had paid the Interim Receiver and 
there was, there was a difference of $6,000 
that was in transit that at the time of 
transfer the bank was not aware of. When 
that check came through and cleared, the bank 
reduced the deposit by that amount of 
$6,000." 
(Record, p. 1096) 
Jensen admitted that the $7 7,500 had been taken by him from 
the company and transferred to his personal account in 
California. (Record, p. 1210). He did not return it until he 
absolutely had to; only after a permanent receiver had been 
appointed and it was obvious the loss would be discovered. 
Jensen himself testified that the sum deducted from the $77,500 
may have not been exactly $6,000 as he just had the balance in 
the account transferred to the receiver and he was not sure of 
the exact balance. (Record, p. 1405). 
Jensen had the burden to prove the amount and source of 
these funds but refused. The Court ordered him to provide the 
identify of the account from which this sum was originated. The 
trial was interrupted to allow Jensen until October 17, 1986, to 
provide such information and the trial resumed on that date. 
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Upon reconvening, defendant said the moritey came from a different 
account, "an escrow fund" (no records c}f which were previously 
produced) and refused again to provide any documentation or 
information relating to that account. (Record, pp. 1470-1476). 
The Court's Finding 41 is an exqellent analysis of the 
evidence relating to this issue and shoujLd be upheld. 
POINT VIII. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDING OF FACT 42. 
Exhibit 33 is a check dated December 28, 1984, payable to 
Jensen's bank in California for the sum of $15,000. Jensen 
obtained cash for this sum in the form of a cashiers check. 
Jensen provided no proof that this money was given or transferred 
to the motel other than his testimony which the Court tended not 
to believe. 
The accountant testified that no documentation existed 
showing that such cashiers check was received by the motel 
(Record, p. 1298). This is sufficient evidence to support the 
Court's holding in Fact 42 which should therefore be upheld. 
POINT IX. 
THE EVIDENCE I S SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
C O U R T ' S SUMMARY ACCOUNTING OF THE DRAW 
ACCOUNTS. 
J e n s e n ' s a r g u m e n t s i n h i s p a r a g r a p h s IX and X, a t t e m p t i n g t o 
r e s t r u c t u r e t h e C o u r t ' s F i n d i n g s on t h e F o l s o m Draw A c c o u n t and 
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the Jensen Draw Account should be denied based upon Respondent's 
above arguments. 
POINT X, 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S CALCULATION OF DAMAGES 
I S S U P P O R T E D BY THE E V I D E N C E , AND WAS 
CALCULATED CORRECTLY. 
J e n s e n ' s a r g u m e n t f o r a r e d u c t i o n o f t h e j u d g m e n t by o n e -
h a l f m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e f a c t s a n d m i s s t a t e s t h e C o u r t ' s 
F i n d i n g s r e l a t i n g t o t h i s i s s u e . 
On D e c e m b e r 8 , 1 9 8 6 , t h e C o u r t r e n d e r e d i t s M e m o r a n d u m 
D e c i s i o n . ( R e c o r d , p . 5 7 6 - 6 0 2 ) . The d r a w a c c o u n t o f F o l s o m was 
d e t e r m i n e d t o b e $ 4 7 , 9 9 4 . 2 2 ( p a r a g r a p h 3) a n d t h e d r a w a c c o u n t of 
J e n s e n was d e t e r m i n e d t o b e $ 3 1 7 , 0 0 0 . 5 3 ( p a r a g r a p h 4 ) . T h e s e 
F i n d i n g s e s t a b l i s h e d a d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e d r a w a c c o u n t s o f 
$ 2 6 9 , 0 0 6 . 3 5 . T h i s w a s t h e sum t h a t d e f e n d a n t F o l s o m w a s t o 
r e c e i v e t o b a l a n c e t h e r e s p e c t i v e d r a w a c c o u n t s . I n p a r a g r a p h 
4 ( b ) ( 1 ) , h o w e v e r , t h e C o u r t i n c o r r e c t l y a w a r d e d F o l s o m t h e sum of 
$ 1 3 4 , 5 0 3 . 1 8 . . . . " t o e q u a l i z e t h e d r a w a c c o u n t s o f t h e 
p a r t i e s " ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . I t w a s o b v i o u s t h a t t h i s w a s a 
c o m p u t a t i o n a l e r r o r , a s t h e f i g u r e n e e d e d f rom t h e b u s i n e s s t o 
e q u a l i z e t h e d r a w a c c o u n t s was $ 2 6 9 , 0 0 6 . 3 5 . 
On J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 8 7 , F o l s o m f i l e d a m o t i o n t o c o r r e c t t h i s 
e r r o r , s u p p o r t e d b y a memorandum. ( R e c o r d , p p . 6 0 3 - 6 0 7 ) . 
J e n s e n ' s s t a t e m e n t t h a t " t o e q u a l i z e t h e a c c o u n t s , t h e C o u r t 
r e q u i r e d J e n s e n t o p a y F o l s o m o n e - h a l f o f s a i d sum . . . " i s 
f a c t u a l l y i n c o r r e c t . ( A p p e l l a n t ' s B r i e f , p . 1 9 ) . The p a r t i e s 
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stipulated, and the Court ordered that the business be sold and 
the first proceeds be paid to Folsom until the drawings were 
equalized. Thus, Jensen is being allowed to keep the $317,000.59 
the Court found that he received out of the business and is 
allowing Folsom to draw out of the business an amount equal to 
what Jensen received. 
Paragraph 4(a) of the Judgment is correct in stating the sum 
of $269,006.35 as the sum needed for the business to equalize the 
draw accounts. This is obvious and consistent with the Court's 
ruling in paragraphs 1 and 2 setting the draw accounts of Jensen 
at $317,000.57 and Folsom at $47,994.72 ($317,000.53 - $47,994.22 
= $269,006.35). 
The court further ordered in the Judgment, paragraph 4(b), 
that after the draw accounts were equalized, any net equity 
remaining was to be divided equally between Jensen and Folsom; 
and 4(c) that in the event the sale proceeds were insufficient to 
equalize the draw accounts, Folsom would have a judgment for one-
half of the deficiency against Jensen personally. (Record, pp. 
693-695). These provisions have not been contested, but do 
further clarify the correctness of the Court's ruling. 
The Court's ruling was proper, is supported overwhelmingly 
by all of the accounting evidence and testimony herein and should 
be upheld. 
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POINT XI. 
A PARTNER WHO DIVERTS ASSETS FROM PARTNERSHIP 
ACCOUNTS INTO HIS PERSONAL ACCOUNTS AND 
COMMINGLES ASSETS HAS THE BURDEN OF (1) 
PROVING WHICH ACCOUNTS WERE PARTNERSHIP AND 
WHICH WERE NOT, (2) IDENTIFYING THE SOURCE OF 
FUNDS CONTAINED IN NON-PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTS, 
AND (3) PROVING THAT FUNDS WHICH HAD BEEN IN 
PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTS AND SUBSEQUENTLY REMOVED 
WERE ADEQUATELY ACCOUNTED FOR. 
U.C.A. 48-1-18 imposes a fiduciary duty upon a partner to 
account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee 
for it any profits, derived without the consent of the other 
partners from any transaction relating to the conduct of the 
partnership. Folsom was also entitled to a full accounting from 
Jensen in accordance with the provisions of U.C.A. 48-1-19(1) and 
by ORDER OF THE COURT. 
Jensen himself acknowledged that he felt himself a fiduciary 
to the company acting in a fiduciary capacity (Record, pp. 14 75-
1476). As argued above, Jensen admitted establishing numerous 
bank accounts and transferring company monies into those personal 
accounts in a surreptitious and improper manner; then kiting the 
accounts to "hide the funds from the IRS" and from Folsom. 
(Record, pp. 1401-1439). At one point in his testimony, after 
admitting transferring a $77,000 sum of company money to his 
private account, he made the following admission: 
"Q: Are you telling me that $77,000 came 
from your Apple City account? 
A: I don't know if it came from the Apple 
City, or it was a loan proceeds. I explained 
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earlier that I kept an ongoing account of 
what I owed the corporation* I did keep them 
separated. ( Record, pT 1J471) (Emphasis 
added). 
Contrary to this testimony, however, Jensen provided no 
evidence whatsoever relating to such an accounting. No records 
or financial statements were supplied by Jensen giving such an 
accounting. He provided no bank statements showing a full record 
of his California and other personal accounts. No record of the 
so-called "escrow account" where company monies were placed, no 
proof that all of the funds conveyed and transferred by him were 
properly accounted for. This was a breaich of his recognized and 
acknowledged fiduciary duty. He had the burden to provide such 
an account and refused. In fact, he was so ORDERED by the Court 
and refused, resulting in his being found in contempt of court. 
In the Matter of the Estate of Harris, 728 P.2d 1003 (Utah, 
1986), allegations were made by a second partner that certain 
funds had been commingled with assets of the first partner. The 
Court held that where the first partner's executrix had control 
of the bank accounts of the first partner's estate and records of 
those accounts, the first partner had the burden of (1) proving 
which accounts were partnership accounts and which were not, (2) 
identifying the source of funds contained in non-partnership 
accounts if possible, and (3) proving that the funds, which had 
been in partnership accounts and had been removed from those 
accounts had been adequately accounted for. (pp* 1006-1007). 
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This is the standard of proof which applied to Jensen and 
for which the Court properly held that he failed to meet. 
Where the trial courts findings are supported by substan-
tial, competent evidence, they should not be disturbed on appeal. 
Circle Airfreight v. Boyce Equipment, 69 Utah Advance Report 39 
(Court of Appeals - 1987)• Factual findings should be upheld 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard should be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a); Lemon v. Coates, 
735 P.2d 58,60 (Utah, 1987); Webster v. Lehmer, 742 P.2d 
1203,1206 (Utah, 1987); Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 149-150 
(Utah 1987); Zions First National Bank v. National American Title 
Insurance Company, 74 Utah Advance Report 12,13 (1988). 
The trial courts findings of fact herein are supported by 
ample evidence, are not clearly erroneous, and should therefore 
be upheld. 
The standard of review as relates to conclusions of law 
dictates that the upper court give such conclusions no particular 
deference, but review them for correctness. Scharf v. MMG 
Corp., 700 P.2d 1068,1070 (Utah 1985). Appellant's only claimed 
error of law was his allegations in XI of his brief, claiming a 
fifty percent error in calculation of damages. The Court was 
correct in its conclusion relating to this issue, and its 
decision should be upheld. 
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CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court should be 
affirmed in all its particulars as the Court had substantial 
facts and evidence upon which to support its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. The issues raised by Appellant on appeal are 
without merit and their determination does not have a significant 
bearing on the state of the law in Utal*i or the circumstances of 
this case. 
Respondent respectfully submits that it be allowed to 
recover its reasonable attorney's fees and costs in defending 
this appeal. 
DATED this 6th day of December, 1988. 
UNGRICHTT^RANDLE & DEAMER 
*ry Lmgricht 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent Leo F. Folsom 
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